

STATE PAPER

November 1953.

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

CONTROL OF NON-COMMUNIST TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA
AND NORTH KOREA

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CONTROL OF NON-COMMUNIST TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA AND NORTH KOREA

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INTRODUCTION

The control of non-Communist trade with Communist China and North Korea is carried out on a multilateral and bilateral as well as a unilateral basis. Multilateral controls are applied by both a group of 15 countries belonging to an organization known as the Consultative Group and Coordinating Committee (COCOM/ChinCom) and some 45 countries which support a selective embargo resolution adopted by the United Nations on May 18, 1951. Multilateral controls have, to date, been limited to the embargo of specified goods or categories of goods, and have not yet been extended to other controls, such as transshipment, financial, shipping, and bunkering controls.

The only bilateral controls agreed upon formally are those exercised under the Japanese-U. S. Bilateral Agreement. These controls are also limited to the embargo of specified goods.

The unilateral embargo of various goods, in addition to those embargoed under COCOM/ChinCom agreements or the UN resolution of May 18, 1951, is carried out by some 20-odd countries. Very few of these countries prohibit the export of all goods to Communist China and North Korea, but most of them embargo the various categories of goods they consider strategic.

Transshipment controls are carried out unilaterally by only a few countries, and, except for the United States and the United Kingdom, it appears none of them have adopted such controls specifically for the purpose of preventing the transshipment of strategic goods to Communist China and North Korea.

The United States appears to be the only country to have adopted controls specifically for the purpose of regulating or preventing financial transactions with Communist China or North Korea. Under these controls, the United States prohibits also

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the importation of goods from Communist China and North Korea. The only other country which seems specifically to have prohibited the importation of goods from those areas is Greece.

Controls on shipping in the trade with Communist China and North Korea have been adopted by practically all of the leading maritime non-Communist countries. A few, like the United States, have prohibited their ships from calling at Communist Chinese and North Korean ports, but most of these countries are concerned only with preventing their ships from carrying strategic goods to Communist China and North Korea.

Bunkering controls on vessels in the trade with Communist China and North Korea have been adopted by only the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Japan, but as practically all of the distributors of bunkers and other petroleum products to vessels in this trade are under the jurisdiction of one of these countries, the application of these controls is geographically adequate.

In general, it appears that the embargo by non-Communist countries of goods to Communist China and North Korea is quite extensive and that shipping and bunkering controls are likewise applied on a fairly broad basis. The controls over transshipments to Communist China and North Korea and on financial transactions with these areas do not, on the other hand, appear to have been generally developed.

MULTILATERAL CONTROLS

COCOM/CHINCOM

Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War the countries participating in the international Consultative Group and Coordinating Committee (COCOM)* in Paris had not agreed to a uniform policy to control the export of strategic items to Communist China which at that time was not treated formally by the Committee as a part of the Soviet Bloc. In July 1950 the Coordinating Committee redefined the Soviet Bloc to include Communist China and North Korea. This action made applicable to Communist China the COCOM controls in force against the Soviet Bloc. These controls provide an embargo on exports to Communist China of all items in International Lists I, II, and III (TAB A-1).

In the

*The countries participating in the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) as of July 1950 were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Portugal was admitted to COCOM in the summer of 1951, Japan in September 1952, and Greece and Turkey in August 1953.

In the fall of 1952 a China Committee (CHINCOM) was set up for the purpose of developing detailed aspects of security export control policy relating to Communist China. This Committee has adopted a China Special List consisting of a number of items in addition to International Lists I, II, and III (TAB A-2). An exceptions procedure is provided covering the embargo of International Lists III and the China Special List. Each CHINCOM country may export, at its own discretion, such items to Communist China without quantitative restrictions if it is satisfied that such exports are solely for civilian use and will not contribute to the military strength of Communist China. Such shipments need only be reported to CHINCOM within the following month.

UNITED NATIONS

Pursuant to Resolution 500 (V) adopted by the United Nations on May 18, 1951 (TAB A-3), 45 nations indicated that in accordance with the recommendations of the Resolution, they were applying embargoes on the shipment to Communist China and North Korea of "arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war" (TAB A-4). Since each country is free under the Resolution, however, to adopt its own interpretation as to what constitutes "transportation materials of strategic value" and "items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war," lists in individual countries vary widely.

BILATERAL CONTROLS

U. S. BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN

The United States and Japan signed a bilateral agreement on September 5, 1952, under which Japan undertook (1) to embargo the commodities enumerated in any international control list, (2) to continue to embargo commodities included in the U. S. security lists but not listed in the international control lists, (3) until a more definitive determination is made, to embargo items found to be readily determinable as of strategic significance to Communist China, and (4) to exercise controls over certain other items. Under point 3 the U. S. proposed a list of some 400 items for consideration (TAB A-5). Except for some 40 items which were still under negotiation and another 100-odd items which U. S. has

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since agreed to delete from the list, the Japanese Government continues to embargo the remaining items pending agreement between the two countries as to their future status.

UNILATERAL CONTROLS

UNITED STATES

The United States Government has applied controls over the shipment of atomic energy materials since 1946 (TAB A-6). The export of arms, munitions, and implements of war is controlled under the Presidential Proclamation of January 1, 1954 (TAB A-7). No shipments of these materials have ever been licensed to Communist China or North Korea. The export of commodities in short supply and of strategic materials which are on the so-called Positive List is controlled under the authority of the Export Control Act of 1949 (TAB A-3). Following the attack by the North Koreans on the Republic of Korea, the United States, on July 20, 1950, applied an embargo on the shipment to Communist China of all of these items.

When the Chinese Communists intervened in the Korean struggle, an order was issued providing that as from December 3, 1950, all exports from the United States to Communist China or to Hong Kong and Macao would be subject to screening, and it revoked all General Licenses for such exports (a new General License was established on October 22, 1953 and extended on January 16, 1954 to permit the exportation of specified commodities to Hong Kong). Likewise, all outstanding validated export licenses to Hong Kong and Macao were suspended as from December 8, 1950 (TAB A-9). On December 4 and 6, 1950, moreover, orders were placed in force providing that shipments of all commodities originating in any foreign country and in transit through the United States to Communist China, Hong Kong or Macao, should require a validated export license (TAB B-1).

A few days later, on December 8, 1950, the United States went further and issued Transportation Order T-1 which prohibits the transport in any ship or aircraft under the United States flag of any commodities on the Positive List, the Munitions List, or controlled for export under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, to Communist China, Hong Kong or Macao (TAB D-1). It provides further that no person shall discharge from any such ship or aircraft any of these commodities at any of these ports or at any other ports in transit to those destinations, without a validated export license or proper authorization.

United States controls over shipping to Communist China were completed shortly thereafter, on December 16, 1950, by the issuance of

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Transportation Order T-2, providing that no person shall transport to Communist China cargo of any kind in any ship or aircraft flying the flag of the United States (TAB D-2). It further provides that no cargo of any kind shall be taken on board any such ship or aircraft if there is reason to believe that it is destined, directly or indirectly, to Communist China. Also, it prohibits any ship or aircraft under the flag of the United States from discharging (except at the point of origin or in the United States or Japan) any cargo destined to Communist China.

Action was also taken by the United States on December 17, 1950, to block the United States assets of residents of Communist China and North Korea, and to place all financial transactions of any kind between the United States (or persons subject to United States jurisdiction) and Communist China under strict license control (TAB C-1).

An act of Congress, commonly known as the Battle Act, provided that as from January 1952, all recipients of U. S. military, economic, or financial aid are to apply selective export controls against the Soviet Bloc as a condition for the continued receipt of such aid, and the Act is to be "administered in such a way as to bring about the fullest support" for the UN Additional Measures Resolution. The list of commodities to be embargoed under Title I, Category A, comprises "arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic energy materials." Title I, Category B, is composed of "petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and those items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war." The Title I, Category B, list coincides in general with International List I with the exception of four items on the U. S. List IA (heavy rails, general-service locomotives, automatic railway signal equipment, and important forms of aluminum) which are on International List II. The Act requires that the President of the United States terminate aid to any country which knowingly permits shipments of Title I, Category A, items to the Soviet Bloc countries. In the case of items under Title I, Category B, the President may direct the continuance of aid to a country which permits shipments of those items when unusual circumstances indicate that the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States (TAB A-10).

The denial of bunkers to vessels in the trade with Communist China was carried out on a voluntary basis by U. S. oil companies until August 4, 1952, when they were informed by Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury, that the Treasury has ruled that the FAC regulations issued under the Trading with the Enemy Act prohibit U. S. oil companies from supplying bunkers or other petroleum

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products to vessels destined for Far East Communist ports or Macao or to vessels not so destined but carrying cargo destined for Communist China or North Korea, unless specially authorized (TAB E-1). It was provided that if in a particular case an oil company has reason to believe that a vessel is not carrying cargo of a strategic nature, it may apply for an exemption. For this purpose cargo of a strategic nature means any article on the munitions list, the AEC list, or the Positive List.

On April 15, 1953, Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury, informed U. S. oil companies that they would be prohibited also from supplying bunkers and other petroleum products to vessels returning from voyages to a Far East Communist port or Macao, or which did not call at such a port but were believed to have been refused bunkers or other petroleum products by a U. S. oil company on the outbound voyage pursuant to Treasury instructions (TAB E-2). Provision was made that if an oil company had reason to believe that a vessel returning from a Far East Communist port or Macao carried on the outward voyage solely cargo not of a strategic nature and had not been denied bunkers by U. S. oil companies on the outward voyage, it may apply for an exemption.

Following the example of Foreign Assets Control, Department of Treasury, the Department of Commerce introduced controls on June 6, 1953, over bunkering in United States ports of vessels in the trade with Communist China (TAB E-3). It provided that a foreign carrier which has called at a Far East Communist port or Macao since January 1, 1953, or is bound for such a port within 120 days (30 days for aircraft), and will carry any commodities of any origin destined to such a port, cannot be bunkered except under a validated license issued by the Department of Commerce.

Beginning about this time, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) undertook to prevent vessels chartered by it from engaging in the trade with Communist China. A clause is inserted in its charter parties for movement of cargoes to Formosa which stipulates that vessels will not engage in trade with Communist China or any other Soviet Bloc destination for a period of 60 days after discharge of cargo in Formosa. Likewise, a restrictive clause is inserted in MSA (now FOA) charter parties for the movement of cargoes to Indochina, Thailand, and the Philippines which prohibits a vessel from calling at any Communist Far East port for 60 days after discharge of cargo in the specified area. Other Government agencies have agreed to take similar action for charter parties applicable to areas covered by their programs.

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UNITED KINGDOM

In addition to the categories embargoed under the UN Resolution of May 18, 1951, metals, minerals, and their manufactures, rubber and rubber products, chemicals for the production of various strategic products, petroleum refinery equipment, electronic (including radio and radar) equipment, precision and scientific instruments, and various other machinery and accessories (including metal-working machine tools and industrial diamonds), ball bearings, electric generators and motors, steel mill equipment, welding equipment, measuring and testing equipment and machines, important abrasives, etc., are subject to embargo by the United Kingdom for export to Communist China (TAB A-4).

The U. K. has a transshipment licensing system similar to that of the U. S. but uses a less comprehensive list which covers in effect arms and munitions, all goods on International List I, a few on II/II, all metal-working machine tools, and rubber, as these are considered by the U. K. to be of major strategic importance to Communist China. The U. K. transshipment control applies to goods on its transshipment list when in transit, whether or not on a through bill of lading, landed on the quay side or transferred from one vessel to another in the U. K., but not to goods in transit which remain on board a vessel even when they are reconsigned to a new destination.

On March 31, 1953, the U. K. and colonies imposed a system of voyage licensing to prohibit British ships over 500 GRT from carrying strategic cargo to any Chinese Communist port. This system applies to all ships registered in the U. K. and the colonies, whether or not chartered to foreign charterers, and irrespective of the origin of the cargo. Strategic cargo, for voyage licensing purposes, is defined by a list covering substantially the items on the U. K. China Prohibited List, but simplified in statement for purposes of recognition. The terms of the license prohibit the ship from carrying listed goods to Communist Chinese ports, and the duty of compliance rests with the owners and masters (TAB D-3).

The U. K. adopted formal bunkering controls on April 30, 1953, for vessels in the trade with Communist China. These controls provide that British oil companies must refer to the U. K. Government every request for the supply of bunkers to vessels sailing to Communist China if they are of Soviet registry or sailing from Soviet Bloc ports. In such cases, the request will be refused. Bunkering requests for other ships sailing to Communist China and not subject to voyage licensing are referred to the U. K. Government for guidance where time permits, and will be refused, or acceptances cancelled, if there is information available that they are carrying a

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significant quantity of strategic cargo. A similar system of control applies to the supply of marine lubricants and bunker coal (TAB E-4).

FRANCE

In addition to the controls applied under the UN Resolution of May 18, 1951, the Government of France does not permit the exportation to Communist China and North Korea of an additional list of items including machine tools, chemical equipment, chemical products, petroleum production equipment, electrical equipment, industrial equipment, electronic equipment, precision instruments, and metals. The list is being constantly revised so that the control may be more effective (TAB A-4).

On March 28, 1953, the French Government stated it intended to take the measures necessary to prevent the transportation by French ships of cargoes of strategic character to ports of Communist China. Several contacts were made by French officials with those of other friendly governments to assure multilateral action in this field. Meanwhile, to avoid the transport on French vessels of strategic commodities to Communist China, the French Government has reached agreement with the only French shipping firms operating on the Communist China run that the latter will not transport commodities of any description to Communist China unless these are covered by an export license or permit indicating Communist China as the destination and issued by the French Government or a foreign government maintaining the same level of controls over exports of strategic items to Communist China as is maintained by the French Government.

The French Government in December 1952 undertook to restrict the bunkering of Soviet Bloc vessels at Djibouti. In March 1953, it agreed to adopt formal controls to prevent the bunkering by French oil companies of vessels carrying cargoes of strategic materials to Communist China.

WEST GERMANY

The export from the Federal Republic of Germany to Communist China or North Korea of any goods which might be used directly or indirectly in the conduct of the war or the manufacture of implements of war or strategic materials is not permitted (TAB A-4).

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The West German Government, according to its delegate in ChinCom, does not intend to enact shipping controls officially or unofficially, as Germany has no tramp ships operating to Communist China, and there is, accordingly, no need for such controls.

NETHERLANDS

Beside war material, licenses have not been granted by the Netherlands for the export to Communist China and to North Korea of a great many commodities which are listed as strategic goods; these include metal-working machinery, chemical equipment, petroleum equipment, electrical equipment, power generating equipment, metallurgical equipment, rubber-working machinery, equipment for carbon-black, radio-valve and rayon manufacturing, tools and equipment, other general industrial equipment, transportation equipment and electronics, precision instruments, metal and mineral manufactures, basic metals and mineral products, minerals, industrial chemicals, synthetic rubber, pneumatic tires and inner tubes, masterbatch and optical glass (TAB A-4).

By a decree of April 24, promulgated May 12, 1953, the Netherlands Government provided for the regulation of shipment of strategic goods to Communist China and North Korea. The decree embodies the arms and munitions list and provides for the issuance of a list of "strategic goods" which became effective June 1, 1953. Covering licenses are required for all exports licensed by members of COCOM and for shipments to Japan when made via Communist Chinese ports. In actual practice, the Netherlands proposes to apply the International China Embargo List (TAB D-4).

BELGIUM

Belgium has imposed an embargo on shipments of arms, ammunition, and implements of war from the beginning of the aggression in Korea and since November 1950, has maintained an embargo on the shipment of atomic energy materials, petroleum, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war for Communist China and North Korea (TAB A-4).

No Belgian line maintains a regular service to Communist China, nor is any Belgian vessel carrying on coastal traffic in Communist Chinese waters. Belgian authorities have undertaken not to permit the charter of Belgian ships to foreign countries unless they are assured that the chartered vessels are not to carry strategic goods to Communist China.

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DENMARK

On February 9, 1951, the Danish Government issued a decree prohibiting the export to Communist China and North Korea of certain commodities of special importance for defense production (TAB A-4).

Under an unofficial agreement of July 1951, the Danish Government controlled the chartering of ships by Danish owners to the Soviet Bloc. On July 29, 1953, the Government adopted a system of voyage control based on agreement with Danish shipowners. A committee was set up and empowered to issue short-term shipping licenses to ships not carrying strategic goods to Communist China. The China Special List was taken as the basis for determining whether the cargo is of a strategic nature.

As regards bunkering controls, the Danish Government accepted the refusal of bunkering to any Danish ship carrying strategic goods to Communist China.

NORWAY

Following the adoption of the UN Resolution of May 18, 1951, the Norwegian Government reported that it had put into effect an embargo on the export to areas under the control of the Communist Chinese and North Korean authorities all the arms and materials mentioned in the Resolution, and had also taken steps to prevent Norwegian ships from transporting such goods from Norway (TAB A-4). As from April 1953, the Norwegian Government, under a contract with the Norwegian Shipowners Association, and with the agreement of semiofficial Norwegian Mutual Maritime, refuses war risk insurance to any ship carrying strategic goods to Communist China and North Korea. The control is based on the simplified version of the U. K. List.

CANADA

In addition to an embargo on arms, ammunition, and implements of war, the Canadian Government broadened the scope of its export controls on December 9, 1950, in such a manner that individual export permits were made a requirement for the export of all commodities without exception, to Communist China, Hong Kong, Macao, and North Korea. Under this provision, permits are denied for a very wide range of other goods which may be considered to be strategic (TAB A-4).

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The voyage control of Canadian registered ships has been put into force by an order, "The Control of Trade by Sea for Mainland China and North Korea, 1953," which came into force on April 20, 1953, and General License No. I of the same date. In the interest of uniformity, the U. K. orders, "Control of Trade by Sea (China and North Korea, 1953)" and "The Control of Trade by Sea, General License 1952", were used as a guide in preparing the Canadian Order and General License (TAB D-3).

Vessels proceeding to Mainland China or North Korea, which wish to bunker at a Canadian port, are required to apply for an individual export permit. Bunkers will be allowed only if the ship is not carrying strategic cargoes, i.e., commodities on the China Lists, which are consigned to Mainland China or North Korea, or is in possession of a voyage license issued by a Government exercising adequate controls to prevent goods of a strategic nature being carried to that area.

ITALY

The embargo by Italy on exports to Communist China and North Korea applies not only to the items embargoed under the UN Resolution but also to metal-working machinery, power-generating equipment, electrical equipment, electronic instruments, industrial equipment, chemical equipment, petroleum equipment, rubber and rubber products, and minerals and their products (TAB A-4).

Italian exports to Communist China, with which Italy does not have a trade agreement, must be paid for in hard currency or must be exchanged for goods acceptable to the Italian Government.

Pending Government review and parliamentary approval of comprehensive shipping controls, the Italian Government exercises only informal controls. It has distributed to Italian harbor captains a list of strategic goods, based on the UK voyage control list, and they in turn advise shipmasters, if asked, of the cargoes the Italian Government hopes they will not carry to Communist China. Italian Government-controlled ships do not call at Communist Chinese ports.

PORTUGAL - MACAO

Portugal has no special controls on exports to Communist China, but for strategic materials shipped from Portugal to Macao, import

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certificates issued by Macao are required.

On January 23, 1952, the Government of Macao adopted a trade-control system which requires a license for the import and the export of strategic materials.

The Portuguese Board of Merchant Marine, which is the competent authority for shipping and bunkering controls, does not allow Portuguese flag vessels to sail to Communist China or North Korea.

GREECE

In addition to its support of the UN embargo, Greece applies an embargo on all exports to the North Korean area (TAB A-4). Greek regulations also prohibit the importation of items originating in Communist China or North Korea.

Effective March 17, 1953, the Greek Government prohibited Greek flag vessels from calling at Communist ports in China and North Korea. This was accomplished by the Greek Council of Ministers Act No. 204 of March 17, which was enacted into law by the Greek Parliament on May 7, 1953 (TAB D-5).

TURKEY

In addition to arms, no strategic materials are exported from Turkey to areas under the control of the Chinese Communists and the North Korean authorities (TAB A-4).

HONG KONG

In June 50, Hong Kong prohibited the export of all articles to North Korea, and in July and August 1950 it prohibited the export to Communist China of some 200 items of strategic importance including petroleum. This list was replaced in June 1951 by a more extensive list which has since been augmented several times (TAB A-11).

Goods which are manifested to another destination and are transiting Hong Kong but which are not off-loaded may proceed without licensing or interference. Where such goods are off-loaded for transshipment, intransit export licenses are issued when covered by through bills of lading to specific final

destinations

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destinations, including Communist China. All goods consigned to Hong Kong, however, are subject to full import and re-export control.

The U. K. Control of Trade by Sea (China and North Korea) Order, 1953, went into effect in Hong Kong on March 31, 1953 (TAB D-3).

JAPAN

Licenses are not granted for the exportation to the Chinese mainland, North Korea, Hong Kong, and Macao of items listed in the export control order of Japan which, in addition to those items embargoed under the UN Resolution of May 18, 1951, includes: ferrous and non-ferrous ores, ferrous and non-ferrous metal products (except household and office supplies, and personal ornaments), minerals and mineral products, sugar and molasses, hides, skins, rubber, certain textiles and paper, rosin, paint, synthetic gums and resins, cellulose, chemicals, medicines, household remedies, fertilizers, fats and oils, scientific and precision instruments, various industrial and construction machinery, textile equipment, silk cocoons, staple foodstuffs, feed, certain wood products and various other materials and products (TAB A-4). In addition, a number of items are embargoed under the bilateral agreement with the U. S. (TAB A-5).

Since June 1951 it has been required that bills of lading issued by carriers for strategic items licensed for export must contain a "Notice to carrier" stating that delivery of strategic goods to destinations other than those declared on an approved application for export license is not allowed without specific prior permission. Such a declaration is required in order to obtain an export license for commodities coming under the Japanese export control list, which includes all items on the China Special List (TAB A-2).

On May 14, 1953, administrative measures were adopted providing that no "bare-boat" or "time" charter to any Japanese ship will be approved unless the Japanese Government is assured that the ship in question will not transport strategic goods to Communist China. Furthermore, all Japanese shipping companies have been warned not to accept "trip" charters to transport strategic materials to Communist China.

Japanese oil and fuel companies are to be warned by the Government that they should not grant bunkering facilities in Japan to any ship carrying strategic goods to Communist China.

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AUSTRALIA

In addition to an embargo on the shipment of arms and directly warlike stores and equipment to Communist China, goods which in the opinion of the Governor General of Australia are capable of being used for purposes of war, cannot be shipped to Communist China without the authorization of the central authority (TAB A-4).

CHINA

Prior to the UN Resolution of May 18, 1951, the Government of the Republic of China imposed a ban on the movement of ships and the shipment of commodities of all kinds to areas under the control of the North Korean authorities and the Chinese Communist regime (TAB A-4). Since the first part of 1953, China will not permit ships to carry goods to Formosa if they are to call at China Mainland or other Communist ports within 60 days following.

COSTA RICA

On January 26, 1952, the Department of Commerce of the Republic of Costa Rica issued an announcement to Costa Rican shipowners, their captains and agents, advising them of recent legislation prohibiting calls at Communist China and North Korea ports by vessels of Costa Rican registry. In addition, this legislation prohibits the transport of strategic materials to Soviet Bloc countries, as well as the transport of such materials ultimately destined for Soviet Bloc countries. A further provision of this legislation requires Government approval of all chartering contracts. (TAB D-6).

CUBA

The exportation to Communist China of all raw materials, products or articles produced, semi-manufactured or manufactured in Cuba is prohibited (TAB A-4).

ETHIOPIA

The Ethiopian authorities impose a ban on all military and economic assistance to both Communist China and North Korea (TAB A-4).

HAITI

An embargo is imposed on all exports to Communist China and North Korea (TAB A-4).

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HONDURAS

On December 22, 1950, the Republic of Honduras issued Consular Circular Number 18, prohibiting calls at Chinese ports by vessels under Honduran registry. This Circular was amended January 27, 1951, to specify "Communist China" ports. (TAB D-7).

INDONESIA

In addition to petroleum and petroleum derivatives, the exportation of rubber, tin, bauxite, manganese ore, coal and industrial diamonds, scrap iron, kapok, fibres, nickel ore, cobalt, sulphur, copper, asbestos, asphalt, and iron ore to Communist China and North Korea is prohibited (TAB A-4).

LIBERIA

On July 23, 1951, Liberia issued its Regulation Number 1-51, prohibiting the unauthorized sale, charter, lease, or delivery of Liberian registered vessels for the transport of strategic cargo to Soviet Bloc countries, including Communist China and North Korea. (TAB D-8).

PANAMA

On August 18, 1951, the Republic of Panama issued its Decree Number 631, prohibiting calls at Communist China and North Korea ports by vessels of Panamanian registry. The Decree further prohibits the transport of war materials suspected to be ultimately destined for Communist China or North Korea. (TAB D-9).

PHILIPPINES

The Philippines prohibit the export to Communist China and North Korea of not only arms, munitions and implements of war, but also control the export of other strategic materials including steel products, medicines, scrap materials (such as copper, lead, brass, iron and steel), machinery, spare parts, foodstuffs, hemp seedlings, gasoline, oil, and lubricants (TAB A-4).

THAILAND

Thailand prohibits the export of foodstuffs, feed grains, timber cotton yarn and other yarns, chemical fertilizers, machines and

accessories

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accessories, agricultural instruments, industrial equipment and tools, medical and pharmaceutical products, chemical products, tin ore, wolfram, tungsten antimony, lead metal, lead ore and zinc, para rubber, castor seed, castor oil, and kapok, as well as war material to the areas under the control of the Chinese Communists and the North Korean authorities (TAB A-4).

VIET NAM

An embargo is applied on exports to Communist China and North Korea of not only the items listed in the UN Resolution of May 18, 1951, but also on rubber and rice (TAB A-4).

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ALL of the Annexes,